The U.S. bombing of three Iranian nuclear services on June 22, 2025, sent shock waves around the world. It marked a dramatic reversal for the Trump administration, which had simply initiated negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear program. Shelling out with diplomacy, the U.S. opted for the primary time for direct army involvement in the then-ongoing Israeli-Iranian conflict.
European governments have lengthy pushed for a diplomatic resolution to Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. But, the response within the capitals of Europe to the U.S. bombing of the nuclear services was surprisingly subdued.
European Fee President Ursula von der Leyen famous Israel’s “right to defend itself and protect its people.” German Chancellor Friedrich Merz was equally supportive, arguing that “this is dirty work that Israel is doing for all of us.” And a joint statement by the E3 – France, the U.Ok. and Germany – tacitly justified the U.S. bombing as obligatory to forestall the potential of Iran growing nuclear weapons.
Europe’s responses to the Israeli and American strikes have been noteworthy due to how little they mentioned the legality of the attacks. There was no such hesitation when Russia targeted civilian nuclear energy infrastructure in Ukraine in 2022.
However the timid response additionally underscored Europe’s bystander function, contrasting with its previous strategy on that subject. Iran’s nuclear program had been a key point of interest of European diplomacy for years. The E3 nations initiated negotiations with Tehran back in 2003. Additionally they helped to facilitate the signing of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which additionally included Russia, the European Union, China, the U.S. and Iran. And the Europeans sought to preserve the agreement, even after the unilateral U.S. withdrawal in 2018 throughout President Donald Trump’s first time period.
As a scholar of transatlantic relations and security, I consider Europe faces lengthy odds to as soon as once more play an impactful function in strengthening the reason for nuclear nonproliferation with Iran. Certainly, contributing to a brand new nuclear settlement with Iran would require Europe to repair a significant rift with Tehran, overcome its inner divisions over the Center East and handle a Trump administration that appears much less intent on being a reliable ally for Europe.
Rising rift between Iran and Europe
For European diplomats, the 2015 deal was constructed on very pragmatic assumptions. It solely coated the nuclear file, versus together with different areas of competition comparable to human rights or Iran’s ballistic missile program. And it supplied a transparent cut price: In trade for better restrictions on its nuclear program, Iran may anticipate the lifting of some current sanctions and a reintegration into the world economic system.
Because of this, the U.S. withdrawal from the deal in 2018 posed a elementary problem to the established order. In addition to exiting, the Trump White Home reimposed heavy secondary sanctions on Iran, which successfully pressured overseas corporations to choose between investing in the U.S. and Iranian markets. European efforts to mitigate the affect of those U.S. sanctions failed, thus undermining the key benefit of the deal for Iran: helping its battered economy. It additionally weakened Tehran’s religion within the worth of Europe as a companion, because it revealed an inability to carve actual independence from the U.S.
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After 2018, relations between Europe and Iran deteriorated considerably. Proof of Iranian state-sponsored terrorism and Iran-linked plots on European soil hardly helped. Furthermore, Europeans strongly objected to Iran supplying Russia with drones in support of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine – and afterward, ballistic missiles as nicely. On the flip aspect, Iran deeply objected to European support for Israel’s war in the Gaza Strip within the aftermath of the Oct. 7, 2023, assaults.
These deep tensions stay a big obstacle to constructive negotiations on the nuclear entrance. Neither aspect at present has a lot to supply to the opposite, nor can Europe depend on any meaningful leverage to influence Iran. And Europe’s wider challenges in its Center East coverage solely compound this drawback.
Inner divisions
In 2015, Europe may current a united entrance on the Iranian nuclear deal partly due to its restricted nature. However with the nonproliferation regime now in tatters amid Trump’s unilateral actions and the unfold of battle throughout the area, it’s now far tougher for European diplomats to place the genie again within the bottle. That’s significantly true given the current fissures over more and more divisive Center East coverage questions and the character of EU diplomacy.
Europe stays very involved about stability within the Center East, together with how conflicts may launch new migratory waves like in 2015-16, when hundreds of thousands of Syrians fled to mainland Europe. The EU additionally stays very active economically in the region and is the largest funder of the Palestinian Authority. But it surely has been extra of a “payer than participant” in the region, struggling to translate financial funding into political affect.
Partially, this follows from the longer-term tendency to depend on U.S. management within the area, letting Washington take the lead in trying to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But it surely additionally displays the deeper divisions between EU member nations.
With overseas coverage selections requiring unanimity, EU members have usually struggled to speak with one voice on the Middle East. Most not too long ago, the debates over whether or not to droop the financial affiliation settlement with Israel over its actions in Gaza or whether or not to acknowledge a Palestinian state clearly underscored the existing EU internal disagreements.
Except Europe can develop a typical strategy towards the Center East, it’s exhausting to see it having sufficient regional affect to matter in future negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. This, in flip, would additionally have an effect on the way it manages its essential, however thorny, relations with the U.S.
Europe within the shadow of Trump
The EU was significantly happy with the 2015 nuclear deal as a result of it represented a strong symbol of multilateral diplomacy. It introduced collectively nice powers within the spirit of bolstering the reason for nuclear nonproliferation.

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Ten years on, the prospects of replicating such worldwide cooperation appear slightly distant. Europe’s relations with China and Russia – two key signers of the unique nuclear deal – have soured dramatically in recent times. And ties with america below Trump have additionally been significantly difficult.
Coping with Washington, within the context of the Iran nuclear program, presents a really sharp dilemma for Europe.
Making an attempt to carve a definite path could also be interesting, however it lacks credibility at this stage. Latest direct talks with Iranian negotiators produced little, and Europe just isn’t ready to offer Iran guarantees that it would not face new strikes from Israel.
And pursuing an unbiased path may simply provoke the ire of Trump, which Europeans are eager to keep away from. There has already been a protracted listing of transatlantic disputes, whether or not over trade, Ukraine or defense spending. European policymakers can be understandably reticent to take a position time and assets in any deal that Trump may once more scuttle at a second’s discover.
Trump, too, is scornful of what European diplomacy may obtain, declaring not too long ago that Iran doesn’t want to talk to Europe. He has as an alternative prioritized bilateral negotiations with Tehran. Alignment with the U.S., due to this fact, might not translate into any nice affect. Trump’s resolution to bomb Iran, in spite of everything, occurred without forewarning for his allies.
Thus, Europe will proceed to pay shut consideration to Iran’s nuclear program. However, constrained by poor relations with Tehran and its inner divisions on the Center East, it’s unlikely that it’ll carve out a significant function on the nuclear file so long as Trump is in workplace.