Within the first 100 days of his second time period, U.S. President Donald Trump has proven a willingness to lean on airpower when his administration decides that navy drive is critical overseas.
To date, the second Trump administration has launched limited airstrikes in Somalia and carried out a weekslong air marketing campaign in opposition to the Iranian-aligned Houthis who rule most of Yemen. The president has additionally threatened direct strikes in opposition to Iran itself ought to talks on a new nuclear deal collapse.
This flip to airpower for Trump is sensible to me. Airpower is cheap in comparison with floor wars, and it normally comes with fewer casualties for these conducting the strikes. This helps clarify why U.S. leaders, together with Trump as a self-proclaimed “anti-war president,” sometimes discover it engaging.
But when the Trump administration is just not cautious, it might fall into what navy strategists informally name the “airpower trap.” This occurs when the said targets of navy drive are too large for airpower alone to realize, probably resulting in a face-saving escalation of battle that might – if historical past is a information – attract floor forces from the U.S. or their native allies.
U.S. presidents resembling Lyndon Johnson, Invoice Clinton and Barack Obama all fell into this entice. In Vietnam, the Balkans and Syria, respectively, all ended up with far larger wars than they bargained for, with penalties for civilian casualties, worldwide peace and injury to America’s status overseas.
As an expert on U.S. national security policy and the Middle East region, I imagine the Trump administration is in peril of falling into the airpower entice in Yemen and will probably do the identical in Iran ought to it elect to make use of direct drive in opposition to Tehran. Recognizing this navy and historic danger, and choosing some sort of off ramp from continued airstrikes, is perhaps the perfect hope the U.S. authorities has to keep away from an extra escalation into full-scale warfare.
The bounds of air bombardment
Research exhibits airpower is simplest when it’s used for restricted targets – issues like taking out leaders of terrorist teams or degrading rival capabilities – or in support of ground operations for extra ambitious ends, like bolstering or overturning governments.
Given the sophistication of U.S. airpower, a common fallacy amongst American strategists particularly is to suppose large strategic beneficial properties may be achieved solely by dropping bombs from above.
However when airpower alone fails, leaders can really feel the strain to increase the scope of battle and find yourself with larger navy commitments than anticipated.
Johnson’s preliminary airpower-only technique for trying to stop communism in South Vietnam failed miserably, resulting in his resolution to commit half 1,000,000 U.S. troops into warfare. That expanded battle presaged years of warfare, with huge humanitarian and political penalties for individuals in Southeast Asia and America, in addition to lasting reputational injury to the U.S.
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Apprehensive about U.S. and NATO credibility, Clinton escalated airstrikes – almost to the point of introducing ground troops – for the formidable finish of stopping genocide within the Balkans throughout the early Nineties. Likewise, Obama’s preliminary airpower-only technique to “degrade and destroy” the Islamic State group shortly faltered, main Obama, underneath intense strain at residence and overseas, to introduce hundreds of floor troops to fight the group’s territorial beneficial properties throughout Syria and Iraq.
In every case, counting on airpower alone in the end failed to satisfy their targets.
The airpower entice in Yemen
There are causes to imagine that situations in Yemen imply that Trump, too, might be falling into the same entice.
Trump has adopted an airpower-only technique to “completely annihilate” the Houthis, a powerful rebel movement that every one however won the recent Yemeni civil war. The proximate reason behind the air marketing campaign, a coverage inaugurated by the Biden administration and expanded dramatically by Trump, is to restore the free flow of shipping within the Purple Sea that the Houthis have disrupted by drive to protest Israel’s ongoing warfare in Gaza.
The early indicators are that this air marketing campaign isn’t going properly.
Regardless of the U.S. burning through finite munitions supplies at a cost of US$1 billion to bomb at least 800 sites since March 15, the Houthis are undeterred and the quantity of Purple Sea delivery stays as depressed as ever. Houthi attacks on U.S. ships and Israel proceed. A Houthi missile narrowly missed Israel’s Ben-Gurion airport on Could 4.
The truth is, the direct attacks on the Houthis and the quickly rising casualty rely among Yemeni civilians from the Trump administration’s bombing marketing campaign look like strengthening the Houthis’ political place in Yemen. In a very stunning case, U.S. bombs reportedly hit an African migrant camp, killing and injuring dozens of individuals.
The humanitarian disaster from the brutal bombing marketing campaign by the Saudi-led coalition in opposition to the Houthis within the late 2010s had a similar effect.
Airpower performed a giant half then, too. The Saudi coalition, supported by the U.S., engaged in some 25,000 air raids in opposition to the Houthis, killing or maiming roughly 19,000 civilians. But regardless of such overwhelming drive, the Houthis stored seizing territory and finally gained the civil warfare, according to experts.
They’ve been the nation’s de facto rulers ever since.
Now, Trump is exploring choices to additional escalate to defeat the Houthis. Studies indicate his administration is considering arming, coaching and enabling anti-Houthi resistance fighters who’re loosely affiliated with Yemen’s authorities in exile to launch floor operations.
Between diplomacy and quagmire
Proxies are a typical device U.S. leaders flip to when caught within the airpower entice. Typically these proxies fulfill American coverage targets, such because the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, or YPG, which helped the U.S. defeat the Islamic state caliphate in 2019.
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Typically, U.S. proxies fail on each strategic and humanitarian phrases, resulting in additional escalation, strategic quagmires for the U.S., and lack of life and political sovereignty for the individuals underneath assault. South Vietnam was an instructive instance.
Riven by corruption, poor governance, weak point and political infighting, the South Vietnamese army and government proved so ineffective at preventing the North Vietnamese that Johnson determined to launch a floor warfare as soon as U.S. airpower failed.
At the moment, the anti-Houthi resistance in Yemen seems much more just like the South Vietnamese authorities than the Kurdish YPG. In line with a 2025 report from the Soufan Center, a safety suppose tank, the anti-Houthi forces are poorly educated and thought of incapable of pulling off victories over the Houthis with out main U.S. help.
In the meantime, the anti-Houthi resistance consists of an estimated 85,000 fighters, in contrast with some 350,000 for the Houthis.
Absent persevering with the air warfare or escalating it right into a extra all-encompassing battle, U.S. officers can nonetheless pursue diplomacy to be able to attempt to discover a political resolution to the Yemen battle.
Regardless of the Trump’s administration public threats, the U.S. is already negotiating with the Houthis’ most important sponsor, Iran.
For his or her half, the Houthis proceed to insist that they are going to cease attacking ships within the Purple Sea if the U.S.-backed Israeli war in Gaza halts, something that happened throughout the latest Gaza ceasefire.
The Trump administration would possibly think about in search of options, resembling direct or oblique talks, if it desires to keep away from getting caught in a widening battle in Yemen. Historical past is filled with examples of what occurs when airpower takes on a logic of its personal.
